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responses
This page considers responses to the Echelon intelligence
network and agencies such as the NSA and DSD.
It covers -
introduction
In essence, responses to Echelon (and to agencies such as
the DSD, GCHQ and NSA) reflect perceptions of the state
and of citizen rights/responsibilities.
Much comment on Echelon embodies a distinctly dystopian
vision of a state driven by an intelligence-industrial complex,
one characterised by pervasive surveillance of all citizens
for hidden and presumably sinister ends. At its most extreme
that vision accommodates perceptions that 'false consciousness'
is induced through systematic propaganda and even subliminal
messaging. In essence, it is a vision of alienation and
disempowerment.
protest
Protest about Echelon has taken the form of demonstrations
outside key facilities, letter writing and email campaigns,
and what are glorified as 'acts of subversion'. The impact
of those protests is likely to be negligible.
Demonstrations have typically ignored particular nodes such
as major telecommunication exchanges (eg the international
exchange at Broadway in NSW) and sites (eg Watsonia Barracks
in Victoria) in favour of pickets outside facilities - such
as Pine Gap or the Deakin Exchange in the ACT - that have
been mythologised. It is even rarer to encounter street
events involving network administrators, eg demonstrations
outside the offices of DSD and Telstra in Australia. Arguably
demonstrations have served to reinforce solidarity among
'true believers' rather than to persuade, enlighten or instead
inconvenience network operators.
The impact of 'subversive' events such as Jam Echelon Day
is unknown but conceivable does more to produce what one
contact dismissed as "warm and fuzzies among the pizza
n penguin class" than to undermine the operation of
the network.
Jam Echelon Day, an annual event launched in 1999, centres
on an invitation for
the
world is invited to protest our global surveillance by
the spooks at Echelon, the global communications monitoring
system that has been set up to keep an eye on all our
potentially subversive business, social, personal and
other communications
That
protest was to be carried out by netizens,
a digital elite, salting their email and other electronic
communications with the keywords supposedly used by the
NSA and its peers in filtering messages. That would muddy
Echelon and, according to some enthusiasts, might even crash
key computers. At the same time potential activists were
to be pointed to Jam Echelon Day sites, few of which are
now online.
One writer commented
While
the goal of 'jamming up' Echelon is a lofty and likely
unattainable one, is it not better to signal displeasure
at being monitored than passively allow it to happen?
We think so. Now is a chance for anyone, regardless of
computer expertise, to become an instant hacktivist -
and all you need is your regular email program.
The Day is reflected in recurrent chatter in online fora,
such as Australia's Whirlpool, with kids congratulating
each other on naughtiness in using words such as "kill
george bush bomb pentagon" or attributing a variety
of ills
to the NSA.
policy
Government responses to Echelon and to citizen disquiet
have been, unsurprisingly, quite ambivalent. That ambivalence
reflects the realities of power relationships and day to
day inter-agency politics.
Some legislators, and even some agencies (such as privacy
watchdogs) have expressed concerns about pervasive surveillance
and the potential for abuse by particular entities or by
individual governments, calling for restrictions on the
activities of agencies such as the NSA. Typically they have
acknowledged the desirability of using sigint for enforcement
of justice (eg restricting drug trafficking and other offences)
and action against international terrorism but been wary
about surveillance of domestic activity.
Analysts have responded by noting difficulties in conceptualising
boundaries between domestic and offshore threats in a borderless
world. Some legislators have got lost in what David Martin
characterised as a "wilderness of mirrors", uncertainty
and mystification.
Others have agreed that surveillance of foes - or potential
foes - is a good thing and that with emergence of a seamless
global information infrastructure (GII)
it is necessary to rethink traditional perceptions about
personal privacy. At the same time they have sought to strengthen
the security of government communications, with the European
Union for example announcing research towards secure communication
based on quantum cryptography — the SECOQC project.
Individual nations such as France appear to have justified
spending on hardware and software by pointing to threats
from Echelon, at the same time developing large-scale GII
surveillance systems of their own.
Most have sought to reinforce government capabilities through
- measures
to inhibit the spread of strong encryption
among individuals and SMEs (and to other states through
for example the Wassenaar
Arrangement)
- enhanced
legal codes, for example the UK Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act covering compulsory provision by citizens
of encryption keys and requirements in Australia and elsewhere
that coopt internet service providers
a politics of the achievable?
An observer might be forgiven for characterising much of
the angst evident in online fora as wasted.
Legislators and policymakers are unlikely to embrace calls
for dismantling of the 'national security state', particularly
during periods when there is a heightened sensitivity about
terrorism and where intelligence agency representatives
make plausible but unverifiable claims that networks such
as Echelon are a silver bullet. tool. It is difficult to
disinter the real financial costs of establishing and maintaining
such networks. Many decisionmakers appear to view their
use as essentially benign - "all they do is look out
for terrorists and paedophiles: if you have done nothing
you have nothing to fear" - because they do not involve
physical intrusions.
Members of parliament and government officials might, however,
be more responsive to agitation for strengthening of privacy
regimes involving nongovernment handling of personal information.
To adapt Scott McNealy's aphorism -
Privacy
from some government agencies has gone, get over it by
ensuring that there are few abuses
Privacy outside government has not gone and is worth fighting
for.
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