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issues and agencies
This page considers questions regarding Echelon (in particular
its regulation and effectiveness), highlights key agencies
and notes some Echelon-watchers.
It covers -
issues
Criticism of ECHELON essentially concerns four issues -
- legitimacy
- equity
- effectiveness
- accountability
Concerns
regarding legitimacy centre on relations
between states, individuals and other entities.
Is it appropriate for a national government to listen to
any/all electronic communications between its citizens,
a surveillance that may be comprehensive and that occurs
without a warrant or other case by case authorisation from
a court? Is it appropriate for governments to skim the communications
of people in other states? Is it appropriate for one government
to share information about its citizens (or those of another
nation) with a second government, and to greatly assist
that second government's collection of data?
Does Echelon allow participating governments to circumvent
formal restrictions on domestic surveillance? Are such restrictions
meaningless in the age of a seamless global information
infrastructure or instead worg preserving and even strengthening?
Concerns regarding equity relate to both
international and domestic relationships.
It is often argued that minor states such as Australia serve
as platforms or agents for data collection but are denied
access to much data and to much analysis of that data. Such
criticism is credible and means that claims of 'partnership'
or a 'special relationship' are at best ironic.
Reports that commercially sensitive information and analysis
derived from signals intercepts are provided to some 'strategic'
corporations on a selective basis are hard to assess but
would appear consistent with historical practice. Critics
have wondered about favouring particular corporations (or
even interests within corporations). They have also noted
reports that US agencies have received information about
bribery and negotiations by foreign competitors to US corporations,
information that has been used to pressure foreign governments.
Others have queried the effectiveness of
Echelon, which because of secrecy serves as a very black
box: money is poured in at one end and the uninitiated must
take it on faith that information (the right information,
aboout the right people) appears at the other end and is
thereafter handled appropriately.
The following page notes that Echelon has been a focus of
popular anxieties, even paranoia, with people variously
fretting that "big brother sees everything, every time
you switch on your computer" and others adopting a
defeatist disengaged attitude to privacy protection and
government accountability.
Some observers have taken a different stance, questioning
whether Echelon and similar systems work well on a day to
day basis.
They have argued that in principle filtering mechanisms
might be easily subverted and that more sophisticated datamining
may not do more than point network operators to a particular
haystack, rather than isolating each and every individual
needle.
In practice a greater challenge is likely to be the task
of making sense of data, particularly making sense in real
or near-real time rather than in retrospect. A recurrent
lament within the intelligence community is that language
skills and context are required to make sense of intercepts
- and that such skills, experience and fingerspitzgefuhl
are uncommon. A corollary has been that intelligence is
not reflected in policymaking and action.
A final concern, perhaps the most salient, is the accountability
of Echelon.
Ordinary citizens - and most legislators - have little sense
of
- what
information is being collected
- how
that information is processed
- who
sights that information
- how
it is collected, stored and integrated with other information
- how
much is spent on collection and storage
- whether
the spending is effective
- whether
collection provides a basis for inappropriate intervention
in personal lives, corporate activity and the politics
of other nations
expansion
In the preceding page we commented that government surveillance
schemes are often incremental rather than revolutionary,
an evolution that may inhibit effective responses by regulators
and rights advocates. Schemes are often particular concern
when they 'value add' through assimilation of new/existing
data collections.
In mid-2006, for example, concern was expressed in the US
after it became clear that the NSA had established a large
scale 'traffic records' database covering billions of calls
made within that nation. The database reportedly did not
supply the content of those calls. Instead it featured a
record of when calls were made, to which numbers those calls
were made and for how long. The NSA appears to have used
social network analysis in an attempt to detect patterns
or, more modestly, to isolate particular parts of the digital
haystack in searching for terrorist needles.
agencies
ECHELON appears to directly involve several UKUSA signals
agencies -
- US
National Security Agency (NSA)
- UK
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
- Australian
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)
-
Canadian Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
-
New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB)
As noted elsewhere on this site politicians and officials
have acknowledged that there is considerable sharing of
information with agencies in other states. The extent of
that sharing, its basis and its effectiveness is unknown
and in practice cannot be determined.
The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
the local equivalent of the US NSA,
is Australia's major player in the global intelligence community,
reflecting a history of cooperation with overseas signals
intelligence bodies (notably those in the US, Canada and
UK) and advantageous geography for handling radio and satellite
traffic.
Its participation in the Echelon network has been criticised
by some liberties groups and parts of the EU Parliament.
It is formally described as "Australia's national authority
for signals intelligence and information security",
with functions of foreign signals intelligence collection
and dissemination and provision of information security
products/services to government agencies (eg advice about
protection of the national information infrastructure and
about cryptographic products).
The US National Security Agency (NSA), headquartered at
Fort Meade, supposedly has a global staff of 38,000 and
a budget of around US$40 to 50 billion - more than the FBI
and the CIA.
The UK UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),
the model for DSD, provides signals intelligence to UK government
agencies and military units and also provides information
assurance. Its site comments
Our
Sigint work protects the vital interests of the nation:
we provide information to support Government decision
making in the fields of national security, military operations
and law enforcement. The intelligence we provide is at
the heart of the struggle against terrorism and also contributes
to the prevention of serious crime. Information Assurance
helps keep Government communication and information systems
safe from hackers and other threats. We also help those
responsible for the UK's critical national infrastructure
(power, water, communications etc.) keep their networks
safe from interference and disruption.
The work done by GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 benefits everyone who
is interested in ensuring that democracy and the rule
of law should prevail. Our intelligence directly supports
UK Government policies but also extends our role within
NATO and Europe, working for common defence purposes.
The FAS estimated that GCHQ might have a budget of over
£400 million and some 4,500 staff.
New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB)
is the NZ counterpart of DSD. As noted in the more detailed
discussion of Australian and NZ intelligence agencies elsewhere
on this site it was the subject of a 1998 review
by the NZ Inspector-General of Intelligence & Security
(IGIS).
The Canadian Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
is an arm of the Department of National Defence. As of 2000
it was reported to a staff of around 890 and an annual budget
of C$110 million.
spywatchers
Watching the watchers (or merely speculating about them)
is a minor industry that extends from serious academic research
through to enthusiasts who fret that the 'invisible government'
is beaming subliminal messages through television sets and
toasters.
Examples are -
- EchelonWatch
| here
- Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) | here
- Federation
of American Scientists (FAS) | here
- EFF
- EFA
- Patrick
Poole's ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance
Network | here
- disinfo.
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